Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy
I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”
This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
关于认真做好2003年春运工作的通知
国家经贸委
国家经济贸易委员会文件
国经贸运行[2002]930号
关于认真做好2003年春运工作的通知
各省、自治区、直辖市及计划单列市人民政府裨河泄夭棵牛?
2003年是贯彻落实党的十六大精神和全面建设小康社会的重要一年。为了认真做好2003年的春节运输工作，使广大群众在喜庆祥和的氛围中欢度我国人民的传统节日，保障社会稳定和促进经济发展，现将有关事项通知如下：
一、春运期限及指导思想
经与有关部门商定，2003年春节运输从1月17日开始，至2月25日结束，共计40天。据预测，春运期间全国旅客运量将达到18.19亿人次，比上年同期增长3.7%。其中：铁路1.3亿人次，增长1%；道路16.56亿人次，增长4%；水运2400万人次，下降1.6%；民航870万人次，增长3.8%。
春运期间，由于“学生流”、“探亲流”、“民工流”和“旅游流”等客流量聚集增加，形成客运高峰，给日常运输工作带来一定困难，特别是铁路运输将出现客运与货运互相争能力的现象。为了保证旅客运输需要，同时做到兼顾货物运输，春运工作的指导思想是“以客为主，客货兼顾，安全第一，快捷有序”，努力实现“旅客购票方便，车船航班正点，出行快捷安全，满意程度提高”的工作目标。
二、主要工作要求
（一）合理安排运力，满足旅客需要。各运输部门要根据春运期间的客流变化规律，充分考虑不同群体流动的特点，提前做好运量预测，安排充足的运输能力，并留有一定的备用运力。要制定多种运输预案，提高应急保障能力，以应对气候突变等不正常情况发生。城市公共交通部门要加强与长途运输部门的联系，掌握旅客集散信息，重点做好车站、码头、机场、长途汽车站等与市内交通的衔接疏运。劳动保障部门要及时发布劳动力市场供求信息，组织民工有序流动，减少盲目外出形成的压力。
在优先保证旅客运输的同时，也要统筹安排好重点物资运输。特别是处于客货运输紧张的地区，运输部门要帮助企业提前做好必要的物资储备，以减少春运期间客运对货运的影响。
（二）加强监督检查，确保运输安全。各地政府要组织公安、交通和安全生产监管部门在春运之前进行一次安全检查。重点检查运输企业的安全规章制度是否健全和落实；铁路和道路的行车条件是否有保障；运输设施是否处于完好状态；严禁不符合安全条件的运输工具投入春运。春运期间，还要加强例行的维修和检查，确保车辆、船舶、飞机及其相关设施处于良好的技术状态。要教育广大驾驶员、乘务员遵守安全驾驶规则，防止超时超限，疲劳驾驶。要做好恶劣气候条件下的事故预防工作，制定突发情况下的车辆通行及事故应急处理预案，确保万无一失。
继续把制止长途客车严重超载作为确保春运安全的一项重要工作抓紧抓实。各地公安和交通部门要共同制定反超载方案，联手采取行之有效的措施，依法对公路客车超载、农用车载客等违章违法行为进行严厉查处。严禁非法改装车、农用车和其他不符合安全要求的车辆参加春运，减少客运群死群伤事故的发生。
由于三峡工程临时船闸能力有限，通过长江水运进出四川的旅客需要在湖北宜昌茅坪港中转，春运期间中转旅客将会大量增加。请湖北省人民政府组织公安、交通部门对宜昌至茅坪港段的道路条件进行整治，加大路面巡查力度，维护通行秩序，确保道路畅通。
（三）强化治安管理，创造良好环境。各地政府要组织有关部门及社会力量采取切实有效措施，强化运输沿线和车站、码头、机场及周边地区的治安整顿，确保广大旅客人身安全和交通工具的安全运行。要重点抓好国道和省际公路的安全畅通，加大治理公路“三乱”力度，坚决打击“车匪路霸”和“拉客”、“倒客”、“倒卖车票”、“欺行霸市”等非法活动，维护广大旅客的合法权益。认真做好防火、防爆和危险物品查禁工作，严禁旅客携带易燃、易爆和危险品乘坐车辆、船舶、飞机旅行，确保运行安全。
加强收费管理，规范执法行为。坚决纠正各种行业不正之风，制止利用春运之机乱涨价、乱罚款、乱收费行为，切实减轻企业和群众的负担。
（四）增强服务意识，提高满意程度。春运期间，交通运输部门职工要克服旅客多、流量大、服务工作难做好的思想，把春运作为检查行业服务水平和展示自身精神风貌的良机。树立全心全意为人民服务的观念，开展各项服务竞赛，在售票服务、站容车貌、通行秩序、运输信息等方面增加服务项目，提高服务质量，为旅客的出行提供各种便利条件。各开放客运口岸要加强联检力量，增设进出通道，加快验放速度，方便旅客出入境。
（五）发挥媒体作用，形成宣传声势。春运期间，要充分利用广播、电视、报纸等媒体的宣传作用，及时提供春运动态，发布车船航班安排、旅游景点状况、安全注意事项、劳动力市场需求等信息，满足广大旅客的需要。要加强对春运情况的正面宣传报道，弘扬好人好事，也要揭露批评不正之风，充分发挥新闻媒体对春运工作的监督促进作用。
三、组织领导及实施工作
各地人民政府和国务院有关部门都要以党的十六大会议精神和“三个代表”重要思想为指导，充分认识做好春运工作的重要意义。各省、自治区、直辖市及计划单列市要成立由政府主管领导牵头，经贸、铁道、交通、民航、城建、公安、劳动保障、旅游、工商、安全生产监管等有关方面负责同志参加的春运工作领导机构，全面负责本地区的春运工作。各地春运领导机构的办公室设在经贸委（经委）或综合交通管理部门，负责本地区春运的综合协调工作。各地春运办公室要会同有关部门结合本地区实际，做好春运期间的客货运输组织协调工作，制定预案和对策，掌握日常动态，及时处理各种突发事件和异常情况。各运输部门应根据行业（系统）工作需要，成立春运工作领导小组或办公室，组织领导本行业（系统）的春节运输工作。各有关政府职能部门要按照各自职责，既各负其责，又形成合力，齐心协力做好工作。
各地区、各部门的领导要深入春运第一线，现场协调解决问题，关心一线职工的工作和生活，帮助他们解决实际困难。对春运工作所需的人力、经费等，各地人民政府和有关部门应给予必要的支持和安排。
春运结束后，各地区、各部门要认真进行总结，进一步提高春运工作的组织管理水平，在春运工作实践中开拓创新，坚持与时俱进。各省、自治区、直辖市及计划单列市的2003年春运工作总结，请抄送国家经贸委（经济运行局）和其他相关部门。
国家经济贸易委员会
二○○二年十二月十二日
